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THE RISK OF RISK MANAGEMENT
Stephan Landsman*
I. RISK MANAGEMENT COMES TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Charles Dickens famously begins his A Tale of Two Cities with the lines,
"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times ... ."I These lines might
be applied with equal force to the large American law firm's experience
over the last two decades. Until the recent economic downturn that is the
inspiration for the present symposium, law firm profits soared and elite
lawyer ranks swelled.2 Yet, all has not been well in the glass towers of the
mighty. A series of ethical scandals ensnared the best and the brightest,
from Kaye Scholer in 1992, 3 to Milbank Tweed in 1997, 4 to those
representing Enron in 2001.5 Recent economic difficulties have heightened
large law firm awareness of and vulnerability to missteps. 6 The dangers to
the firms and their lawyers include not just malpractice claims but "criminal
prosecution (of individual lawyers and law firms collectively), professional
discipline, claims for disgorgement of fees, malicious prosecution,
sanctions, and other allegations of wrongful conduct in the course of law
practice, and even law firm dissolution." 7
One aspect of the elite firm response to the heightened dangers posed by
legal missteps has been the adoption of risk management techniques of the
* DePaul University College of Law, Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social
Policy.
1. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES 8 (Huber Gray Buehler & Lawrence
Mason eds., The MacMillan Co. 1922) (1859).
2. Rita Henley Jensen, Minorities Didn't Share in Firm Growth, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 19,
1990, at 1.
3. See Robert W. Gordon, A Collective Failure of Nerve: The Bar's Response to Kaye
Scholer, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 315 (1998); William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair:
The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998); David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers
After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1145 (1993).
4. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT You KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET
LAWYER (2004).
5. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW. 1403 (2002); Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational
Psychology of Hyper-competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 968 (2002).
6. See generally Symposium, The Economic Downturn and the Legal Profession, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 2051 (2010).
7. Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary Visions of
Lawyer Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 98-99 (2008).
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sort used in business, finance, and the medical world.8 This move has been
trumpeted by some9 and sharply criticized by others. 10 It has led to the
installation of such mechanisms as "in-house advisors and internal controls,
outside consultants and external audits, conflicts of interest protocols, and
continuing legal education training."' It is the aim of this essay to explore
the implications of the rise of legal risk management by viewing it through
the lens of risk management's impact on the practice of medicine-a place
where it has been in use for a considerable period. 12
II. RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE OPERATION OF THE LARGE AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE PROVIDER
Perhaps it would be best to begin with a definition of what risk
management means in the context of the American hospital. According to
Dr. Steve Kraman and attorney Ginny Hamm, leading reformers of the risk
management process, the term
usually refers to self-protective activities meant to prevent real or
potential threats of financial loss due to accident, injury, or medical
malpractice. When a malpractice claim is made against an institution in
the private sector, risk managers coordinate the defense against patients,
their dependents, and their attorneys. The medical institution and the
patient often become adversaries .... 13
This definition provides a series of valuable insights about the nature of
risk management in the medical context. Its mission is to protect the
institution in which it operates from legal claims. What it defends against
are lawsuits based on missteps that a court might find warrant the awarding
of damages. Its efforts often result in the triggering of an intensely
adversarial relation with injured patients who previously received care and
medical advice from the health care provider. The risk management team is
a specialized group that focuses not on the delivery of health care but on the
legal consequences that may arise from iatrogenic injury.
The risk management department sketched in this definition is bottom-
line oriented. Its job is to protect the financial assets of the hospital from
claims asserted through the tort system. As one observer has put it, risk
8. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management,
94 GEO. L.J. 1909, 1933-35 (2006).
9. See Davis, supra note 7, at 113-24.
10. See Alfieri, supra note 8, at 1933-40; see also David B. Wilkins, Teams of Rivals?
Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2067, 2120 (2010) ("[T]here is a danger that the 'risk management' perspective ... will
paradoxically diminish 'a lawyer's individual responsibility for making moral choices about
his role in law and society'...." (quoting Alfieri, supra note 8, at 1939)).
11. Alfieri, supra note 8, at 1910.
12. See Paul R. Frisch et al., Role of Previous Claims and Specialty on the Effectiveness
of Risk-Management Education for Office-Based Physicians, 163 W.J. MED. 346, 348-50
(1995) (charting efficacy of risk management programs since 1979).
13. Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May Be the
Best Policy, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 963, 963 (1999).
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management brings "the harsher aspects of business to the practice of
medicine." 14 The metrics of success are likely to be the number of suits
successfully defended and the number of dollars expended on litigation. In
conjunction with this work, risk managers oversee the institution's
relationship with those providing insurance coverage to pay awards made
against the hospital for medical malpractice. An essential element of the
insurance relationship is to maintain effective "cooperation with the
insurance company in defense of [claims]."'1 5 Such contractually required
cooperation has serious implications for the care provided to patients after
they have suffered injury at the hands of the medical staff. The chief goal
shifts from providing treatment to "paying as little money in settlements as
possible,"' 6 at least in so far as the risk management/insurance team is
concerned.
In order to manage risks, managers must know about them. This spurs
risk managers to undertake a sustained effort to gather information both
about potential risks and about cases involving medical error. 17 Their goal
is to learn as much as possible about legal threats to the hospital so that
problems may be contained. At the same time, risk managers are likely to
be reluctant to provide any information about what they discover to anyone
outside the institution. 18  A team of reformers has observed that risk
management departments are, "[f]or obvious reasons," intensely "reluctant
to publish their experience."'19
Risk managers' penchant for secrecy is most pronounced when injurious
errors are involved. It is here, specifically, that "risk management
models ... recommend less than full disclosure." 20  The objective is to
avoid providing an injured patient with information that might trigger a
lawsuit or be used to support one. The squelching of candor arises out of
the "self-protective model of risk management" that stresses the fiscal
interests of the institution above all else.21 The logical consequence is the
hoarding and withholding of information. Of course, where a patient seeks
legal assistance, "direct communication between the doctor and patient
ceases."
22
The erection of a wall of silence between the doctor and patient is
contrary to the long cherished medical principle that requires the physician
14. R. B. Vukmir, Medical Malpractice: Managing the Risk, 23 MED. & L. 495, 497
(2004).
15. Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from
Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447, 1471 (2000).
16. Kraman & Hamm, supra note 13, at 966.
17. See Stephan Landsman, Reflections on Juryphobia and Medical Malpractice
Reform, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 221, 224-25 (2008).
18. See id. at 224-26.
19. Kraman & Hamm, supra note 13, at 966.
20. Anand Das et al., True Risk Management: Physicians' Liability Risk and the
Practice of Patient-Centered Medicine, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 57, 65 (2003).
21. Kraman & Hamm, supra note 13, at 963.
22. Jonathan Todres, Toward Healing and Restoration for All: Reframing Medical
Malpractice Reform, 39 CoNN. L. REv. 667, 685 (2006).
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"to put the well being of the patient ahead of his or her own interests....
[An obligation] stated overtly in the Hippocratic oath."'23 In order to deter
medical personnel from following this basic ethical imperative, risk
managers wildly exaggerate legal risks or provide misinformation about the
operation of the legal system to "frighten []" doctors. 24 Such misstatements
can have a powerfully chilling effect on a population of medical
professionals that seldom has a clear or accurate picture about how the law
works and harbors the strongest anxieties about litigation. 25
III. RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE RESOLUTION OF DIFFICULT QUESTIONS
OF MEDICAL ETHICS
The risk management team, with its particular legal expertise and mission
to protect the medical institution from claims arising out of wrongful death
and iatrogenic injury, has regularly been drawn into some of the most
challenging treatment decisions doctors face-those involving the rendition
of care to the terminally ill. Risk managers' advice in such circumstances,
all too often, reflects a willingness to brush aside the patient's desires or
interests in favor of what is perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be a course of
action that will insulate caregivers and hospitals from any conceivable legal
claim or adverse publicity. 26
One of the most troubling examples of this sort of behavior occurred in
the notorious case of Samuel Linares. 27 There, the infant Samuel was
brought into Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center (Rush) in
Chicago after having swallowed a balloon.2 8 The child had suffered severe
and irreversible brain damage during the incident and was in a coma. The
medical staff, in accordance with its established treatment guidelines, 29 and
the wishes of Samuel's parents, concluded that the ventilator keeping the
baby alive should be turned off.
This plan was vetoed by the hospital's attorney, Max Brown, on the
ground that it might expose the institution and its employees to a number of
legal risks-the physicians to a charge of homicide30 and the hospital to an
array of tort and regulatory claims. 31 It has been persuasively argued that
23. Steve S. Kraman, A Risk Management Program Based on Full Disclosure and Trust:
Does Everyone Win?, 27 COMPREHENSIVE THERAPY 253, 253 (2001).
24. See Marshall B. Kapp, Treating Medical Charts Near the End of Life: How Legal
Anxieties Inhibit Good Patient Deaths, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 521, 530 (2001).
25. See id. at 523; Bryan A. Liang, The Adverse Event of Unaddressed Medical Error:
Identifying and Filling the Holes in the Health-Care and Legal Systems, 29 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 346, 349 (1997).
26. See Lawrence J. Nelson & Ronald E. Cranford, Legal Advice, Moral Paralysis and
the Death of Samuel Linares, 17 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 316, 321-23 (1989).
27. See id. at 316-17.
28. Id. at 316. Factual material about the Linares case referred to in the text is drawn
from Nelson & Cranford, supra note 26, unless otherwise noted.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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Mr. Brown grossly overstated these concerns. 32 Yet, the hospital staff was
cowed by them and refused to turn off the ventilator without a court order
insulating the hospital and its staff from liability. The hospital placed the
burden of securing such an order on Samuel's family-impoverished and
legally unsophisticated members of Chicago's working class. Brown went
further and, at one point, intimated that Samuel's parents might have been
guilty of neglect and that the hospital might be implicated if it were to cut
off the ventilator.33 Faced with a virtually insurmountable legal barrier,
Samuel's father, Rudy Linares, entered the hospital with a handgun, held
the hospital staff at bay, disconnected the child's ventilator, and held his
baby son in his arms while the infant died.
The incident highlights a number of the problems that may arise when
risk managers are placed in charge of decisions about the delivery of
medical care in difficult and ethically challenging situations. The doctors at
Rush concluded that both medically and ethically the removal of the
ventilator was warranted. This decision was blocked, not on medical
grounds but on the basis of overblown concerns about legal risks to the
hospital and its staff. In other words, an appropriate treatment decision
yielded to fears about hypothesized legal consequences. Those fears turned
the patient and his family into adversaries upon whom all manner of legal
burdens could be imposed and aspersions heaped. It appeared to be of no
importance to the hospital's risk mangers that their demands placed an
impossible burden on Samuel's family. In fact, the risk managers were
busy demonizing their "adversary." Good judgment and decency had
yielded to fear. The patient's interests were subordinated to the institution's
apparent desire for absolute immunity. Risk management hijacked the
treatment process.
Turning off ventilators has not been the only context in which risk
management concerns have been allowed to trump patients' wishes and
sound medical practice. The same sort of problem has arisen with respect
to the use of cardiopulmonary resuscitation on patients who do not wish
such heroic intervention. Risk management directives have led to the
prolonging of a number of such patients' lives without their permission and
in situations yielding an abysmal quality of life. 34 Similar problems have
arisen where patients or their families seek to terminate the use of feeding
and hydration tubes.35  In one such case the attorney overseeing the
hospital's actions stated, "[W]e're getting a heinous result, but we're doing
the right thing," by which he appeared to mean, "following the letter of the
law and minimizing any institutional risk."' 36 Similarly disconcerting risk
management activity has been observed in the treatment of profoundly
32. Seeid. at 317-21.
33. See id. at 316, 320.
34. See Kapp, supra note 24, at 526-28.
35. See id. at 528-30.
36. Gere B. Fulton, The "Non-declarant" in a PVS: Adventures in Ohio's Legal
Wonderland, 20 OHION.U. L. REv. 571, 581 (1994) (alteration in original).
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handicapped newborns. 37 The same sort of troubling intervention has been
remarked with respect to the provision of palliative care involving the use
of pain-relieving medication. Here risk managers, apparently worried about
charges of drug abuse or euthanasia, have frightened medical staffs into
limiting their pain control efforts, sometimes to the point of "'tortur[ing]"'
patients. 38
It might be suggested that this description of risk management is a
caricature, that risk managers are legally careful but caring, and that their
power over physicians' conduct is far more circumscribed than here
suggested. It is hard to determine whether the overcautious, fear-
mongering, adversarial model of risk management is the approach most
institutions use. Yet, careful observers have repeatedly remarked the
negative effects of traditional risk management on the delivery of medical
care. Dr. Steve S. Kraman, who in the 1980s pioneered a reformed risk
management approach that champions "extreme honesty" with patients
about medical errors, described the "self-protective model of risk
management" as nearly "universal" when he began his reform efforts. 39 In
the end-of-life setting one observer, after conducting an extensive set of
interviews with medical professionals over a two-year period, concluded
that there was "a solid consensus ... that physicians caring for seriously ill
and dying patients are compelled by institutional policies and risk
management directives to initiate and continue [inappropriate and
undesired] aggressive, life-prolonging medical interventions. '40 While not
conclusive, these observations suggest the powerful influence of hospital-
rather than patient-centered risk management doctrines. It is perhaps, in
part, in reaction to this that hospice care designed specifically to ease the
burdens of dying patients has grown in popularity across the United
States. 41
In the enumerated situations, risk management's obsession with any
imaginable legal threat to the care-providing institution has been allowed to
override sound medical judgments and established ethical treatment
principles. It may not be unwarranted to suggest that, in a substantial
number of institutions, risk management has undercut appropriate treatment
on the strength of overstated legal concerns. Risk management has decreed
that legal worries, no matter how tenuous, are more important than the
wishes or suffering of patients and the carefully considered ethical
appraisals of the medical profession.
37. See Kapp, supra note 24, at 525.
38. Id. at 532.
39. Kraman & Hamm, supra note 13, at 963.
40. Kapp, supra note 24, at 524 (footnote omitted).
41. See generally Timothy E. Quill, Risk Taking by Physicians in Legally Gray Areas,
57 ALB. L. REv. 693 (1994). I am deeply indebted to the dedicated hospice workers of the
Hospice by the Sea in Boca Raton, Florida, who eased my mother's passing in the summer
of 2009.
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IV. RISK MANAGEMENT AND INNOVATION
Risk management has also inhibited a number of innovations intended to
improve the delivery of medical care. Over the course of the last twenty
years, a movement championing the value of apology in circumstances
where there has been an error in medical care resulting in injury to the
patient has slowly begun to gather momentum. 42 The movement urges
apologies that are completely candid about medical mistakes because this is
"the right thing [for a physician and institution] to do" 43 and because it
yields a range of positive results both for the patient and the physician.44
These include, interestingly, a decline in the number of malpractice suits
filed.45 The apology initiative arose, in significant part, out of the efforts of
Dr. Kraman who introduced a program of full and candid apology at the
Veteran's Administration (VA) Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky, in 1987.46
Since then, his approach has spread both within the VA system 47 and to a
number of large private health care providers.48  Independent of this
movement, the American Medical Association (AMA) has endorsed
candor, stressing the need for truthfulness about iatrogenic injuries so that
patients may be enlisted in the corrective treatment process. 49
Dr. Kraman has noted that traditional risk managers resist the idea of
apology, a reaction he attributes to "the self-protective model of risk
management. ' 50 They have been inclined, as already noted, to champion
something far "less than full disclosure. ' 51 They have been joined in this
by a large number of medical malpractice insurers who "fear that [doctors']
statements may be used against them in court. '52
Risk management has also served as an impediment to an even more
critical reform-the speedy and accurate reporting of medical errors and
42. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients To Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1009
(1999); Cohen, supra note 15, at 1447; Kraman & Hamm, supra note 13, at 963; Landsman,
supra note 17, at 228-29.
43. Kraman, supra note 23, at 254.
44. See Randall R. Bovbjerg & Laurence R. Tancredi, Liability Reform Should Make
Patients Safer: "Avoidable Classes of Events" Are a Key Improvement, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 478, 482 (2005); Cohen, supra note 15, at 1473-74.
45. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 13, at 964-66 & fig.; Charles Vincent et al., Why
Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343
LANCET 1609, 1612 & tbl.5 (1994).
46. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 13, at 964.
47. See id. at 965.
48. See generally Peter Geier, Emerging Med-Mal Strategy: 'I'm Sorry,' NAT'L L.J.
July 17, 2006, at 1.
49. See Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 44, at 482. This responsibility is grounded in
the American Medical Association's declaration that doctors have an ethical duty to "at all
times deal honestly and openly with patients [and provide them] all the facts necessary to
ensure understanding of what has occurred [so that they will] be 'able to make informed
decisions regarding future medical care."' Id.; accord Das et al., supra note 20, at 67-68.
50. Kraman & Hamm, supra note 13, at 963.
51. Das et al., supra note 20, at 65.
52. Kraman, supra note 23, at 254 (citing Cohen, supra note 15, at 27).
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their precursors, near misses. 53 Such reporting offers perhaps the best way
to address mistakes. Through the analysis of such reports, dangerous
practices may be identified and protocols fashioned to curtail them.54 This
is precisely what was done in commercial aviation, and it helped make that
industry one of the safest in the United States. 55 There is real urgency to
the need to identify risks and reduce errors because, according to a 1999
Institute of Medicine report,5 6 anywhere from 44,000 to 98,000 Americans
die in hospitals each year because of medical errors. 57 What is more, in the
time since the disclosure of this enormous death toll, little progress has been
made in reducing it.58 "[S]ignificant reduction of injury remains a distant
prospect . . .59
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, risk managers have stood in the way
of error reduction through reporting. Their secretive ways clash directly
with efforts to share information. As already noted, risk management is the
antithesis of the open experience-sharing systems being called for to
identify and address the medical error problem.60 Moreover, it should be
remembered that risk management is not dedicated to the eradication of
error but to the curtailment of successful lawsuits. 61 Empirical research has
suggested that risk management may not reduce "error and injury."62 In the
experience of the present author, when risk managers were approached by
doctors and medical reformers and asked to participate in reporting systems,
they did what was within their power to block the implementation of such a
program.63
V. PERVERSE INCENTIVES
How did risk management come to wield the power that has allowed it to
move major health care providers along the secretive and adversarial (to
patients) path it has championed? In part, the answer would appear to
reside in basic organizational principles. Departments succeed when they
53. See Liang, supra note 25, at 357-58.
54. See Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting Medical Error: Five Years After the IOM
Report, Have Reporting Systems Made a Measureable Difference?, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 329,
330 (2005); Liang, supra note 25, at 357-60.
55. See Paul Barach, The End of the Beginning: Lessons Learned from the Patient
Safety Movement, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 7, 20-21 (2003); Landsman, supra note 17, at 234;
Liang, supra note 25, at 357-58.
56. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., To ERR Is HUMAN:
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter To ERR Is
HUMAN].
57. Id. at 26.
58. See Drew E. Altman et al., Improving Patient Safety-Five Years After the IOM
Report, 351 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2041, 2042-43 (2004); Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 44,
at 478; Harrington, supra note 54, at 331; Lucian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick, Five
Years After To Err Is Human: What Have We Learned?, 293 JAMA 2384, 2385-90 (2005).
59. Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 44, at 478.
60. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
61. See Todres, supra note 22, at 676-77.
62. Liang, supra note 25, at 348.
63. Landsman, supra note 17, at 224-25.
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are able to expand their authority and increase their staffs. 64 They achieve
these ends by showing how vital they are to the well-being of the
organizations of which they are a part65 and by taking on the nasty chores
that others do not wish to handle.66
Outsized malpractice judgments have become a significant threat to
modem American hospitals. 67 Such judgments can wipe out profits and
empty coffers. Avoiding such judgments may be critical to institutional
success. By addressing the threat posed by malpractice litigation, risk
managers provide what may be perceived within the organization as a
critical service. It is a short step from that view to the conclusion that
particularly risky cases-like those in which a patient may die or suffer
catastrophic injury-require legally driven management. What risk
managers are expected to do in such circumstances is to work to secure the
maximum legal protection from liability for the institution. The orientation
here is not towards care, or the reduction of error, but the tamping down of
the risk of successful legal action. Risk managers may be given even
greater latitude in these matters because doctors are ignorant of and fearful
about the operation of the legal system.68 The more risk managers take
charge, controlling the flow of information and demanding protective court
determinations, the safer the institution may (rightly or wrongly) feel.
News about the incidence of error is suppressed and the power of the courts
is, to all appearances, being successfully invoked to protect the hospital.
The incentives here work against cooperation with patients or corrective
action based on candid recognition of error.
End-of-life decisions are difficult and emotionally wrenching. They
engender deep feelings, both in those directly affected and in medical
personnel.69 Such matters require doctors, as well as family members, to
make irrevocable decisions. It is dangerously attractive, at least to some
medical professionals, to cede such "nasty" decisions to lawyers and the
courts. 70 In this way the difficult and distressing can be given over to
others. Risk managers, with their insistence on things like court orders and
legal control, lift responsibility from caregivers' shoulders. Some treaters
64. See V. CLAYTON SHERMAN, CREATING THE NEW AMERICAN HOSPITAL 116-36 (1993)
(discussing streamlined management systems and how the best departments should be
rewarded with more responsibility).
65. See CHIP CALDWELL, GREG BUTLER & NANCY POSTON, LEAN-SIX SIGMA FOR
HEALTHCARE 81-114 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing how managers who reduce waste in their
departments enhance their role within the organizational structure and make themselves
more valuable members of the organization).
66. See generally V. CLAYTON SHERMAN, RAISING STANDARDS IN AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE 193-214 (1999) (acknowledging the need for recognition of hospital departments and
staff that undertake tough projects and succeed).
67. See Hillary Rodham Clinton & Barack Obama, Making Patient Safety the
Centerpiece of Medical Liability Reform, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2205, 2205 (2006).
68. See Das et al., supra note 20, at 65; Kapp, supra note 24, at 537-46; Liang, supra
note 25, at 349; Nelson & Cranford, supra note 26, at 321.
69. See Quill, supra note 41.
70. See Kapp, supra note 24, at 542-43.
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embrace this sort of intervention. It provides a "pretext" for medical staff
not to have to face the hardest choices. 71 In recent times courts have,
increasingly, been drawn into the most difficult medical decisions. This has
not been because of their special expertise about medical activity at life's
end but so that doctors can avoid some of the challenges presented. 72 Risk
managers facilitate this off-loading and in this way enhance their
importance.
What is shunted aside as risk managers step in is the doctor-patient
relationship. In its place is substituted a process grounded in legal
disputation. Risk management thrives in a climate where the threat of
liability is serious. Its place is secure so long as there are adversaries to
fear. It is likely to devote its energy to a ceaseless effort to identify threats
that require its continuing exercise of authority.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL PRACTICE
It might be suggested that the medical experience with risk management
is irrelevant to the legal world. Hospitals face a vastly larger volume of
malpractice litigation than their legal counterparts. 73  The problems
addressed in medical malpractice litigation frequently involve what might
be described as technical missteps rather than the ethical lapses encountered
in legal malpractice. Doctors often find malpractice principles
incomprehensible 74 while lawyers must demonstrate basic proficiency
concerning the rules of legal ethics to gain admission to the bar.75 Yet, all
of these distinctions are matters of degree rather than kind. Legal
malpractice claims are on the rise,76 and it is naive to think that lawyers are
any more skilled at their craft than doctors are at theirs. The
technical/ethical distinction is not particularly compelling. A doctor's lack
of candor with a patient about risks and alternatives that violates
requirements about informed consent, 77 for example, does not seem very
different from the sorts of claims clients may make when lawyers behave
unethically by withholding critical information. 78 Finally, it is open to
question whether lawyers who do not specialize in matters of attorney
misconduct have any more refined notions of the parameters of liability
71. See id. at 543.
72. See id. at 524.
73. Ellen Wertheimer, Calling It a Leg Doesn't Make It a Leg: Doctors, Lawyers, and
Tort Reform, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 154, 158 (2008).
74. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
75. See generally NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR ExAM'RS & AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF
LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION
REQUIREMENTS (2010), available at http://www.ncbex.org/fileadmin/mediafiles/downloads/
CompGuide/CompGuide_2010.pdft
76. Rachel M. Zahorsky, Clients, Law Firms Get 'Savage'As Legal Malpractice Claims
Increase, A.B.A. J., Feb. 17, 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
clients-law firmsget savage.aslegal-malpracticeclaimsincrease/.
77. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 779-83 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
78. Vincent R. Johnson & Shawn M. Lovom, Misrepresentation by Lawyers About
Credentials or Experience, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 529, 568-76 (2004).
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than do doctors. 79 Medicine's experience may have more than passing
value in helping lawyers appraise the utility of risk management.
Medicine's record suggests that the creation of a risk management unit
within a law firm might be likely to have a number of significant
consequences for the firm. First, it would mean the establishment of a
department dedicated to the protection of the firm from the legal claims of
clients and others rather than the provision of zealous legal representation to
those clients. Its allegiance would be to the firm and its goal to cut
exposure to risk. This is a very different orientation vis-A-vis clients and, in
the medical setting, has resulted in significant tension with traditional
principles regarding care and loyalty. Second, such a unit would have the
same institutional imperatives as its medical counterpart. It would be
inclined to expand its reach by emphasizing the dangers posed to the
institution. This would tend to shift the firm's focus and allegiance from
clients to itself. Risk managers in law firms would, doubtless, be working
with insurers on a continuous basis. This would give insurers a powerful
voice within law firms. That voice, along with the risk manager's, would
be likely to influence firm behavior in ways likely to curtail candor.
In the medical world, risk management appears to have done little to
assuage doctors' fears of the legal system. Indeed, physician anxiety about
the law has grown and has been used to expand the reach of risk
management.80 It is to be expected that risk managers would use fear to
advance their agenda within law firms. Again, the professional population
served is not terribly sophisticated about the risks it faces and may be
susceptible to such manipulation. As has been the case in medicine, risk
management may foster a climate of fear within the profession and a desire
to loosen restrictions on professional conduct. 81
The study of errors in the medical arena suggests that many are due to
systemic failures rather than the glaring and anomalous mistake of a single
individual. 82 The implication of this insight is that error reduction comes
through the improvement of systems rather than the chastisement of
individuals. 83 Risk management's orientation is not systems but individual
cases. It is not generally concerned with systemic improvement.84 The
outlook is likely to be shared by legal risk managers. There is already a
tendency in law firms to look at misdeeds as the failing of a single lawyer
79. See generally David A. Grossbaum & Marian C. Rice, The Art of Risk Management
for Lawyers Representing Lawyers, 76 DEF. CoUNs. J. 405 (2009).
80. See Das et al., supra note 20, at 65.
81. See generally Grena Porto-Spillmann, Analyzing the Needs of the Institution and
Establishing a Risk Management Department, in ESSENTIALS OF HOSPITAL RISK
MANAGEMENT 11-30 (Barbara J. Youngberg ed., 1990) (supporting the notion that risk
management departments, if necessary, can shape a state's regulatory requirements).
82. See To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 56; Liang, supra note 25, at 347.
83. See Liang, supra note 25, at 347.
84. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
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or group of lawyers and to throw those at fault under the bus. 85
Perpetuating this approach does little to enhance error prevention and may
intensify the climate of fear. In the end what may arise is a situation where
lawyers are afraid to act, where, in other words, they face "moral paralysis."
That condition has been observed among doctors working in regimes
wedded to risk management 86 and might be equally likely among
attorneys. 87
Risk management may negatively affect the relation between law firms
and those they deal with. There are empirical data suggesting that risk
management does not work, either to curtail risk or to reduce errors. 88 If
firms come to rely on ineffective risk management regimes they may
periodically face the devastating claims that Kaye Scholer, Milbank Tweed,
and the rest have had to address. Having a faulty risk management regime
may make the firm more vulnerable by engendering a false sense of
security. The risk may thus be heightened not just for the firm but for those
with whom it deals.
One thing that medical risk management seems to do is to turn those
being treated into adversaries at the first sign of trouble. It may be
anticipated that this adversarial shift will also occur in the legal setting.
Such a shift has the most serious implications for lawyers, whose obligation
is to be zealous and loyal. 89 As the firm focus shifts to self-protection,
there may be a turning away from the client and an enhanced desire to
secure official blessing (particularly that provided by a reviewing court) for
the firm's actions. This shifts the emphasis from sound and loyal legal
assessment by the firm's attorneys to third-party judges. The negative
consequences in medicine of such an effect, particularly in end-of-life
situations, have been remarked above.90 The result may be ham-fisted
responses to difficult and highly nuanced legal problems-a retreat to
simplistic self-protective solutions.
VII. A WORD OF CAUTION
Both lawyers and doctors are members of learned professions. The vast
majority of the members of both professions struggle daily to do the right
thing in their professional ministrations. They regularly make difficult
ethical judgments and make them well. They do not cut their patients or
clients adrift. They do not duck hard questions. They do not shirk their
professional responsibilities. The problem is that shouldering such a burden
is challenging and that the promise of an easy solution is always tempting.
85. See David A. Hyman, A Second Opinion on Second Opinions, 84 VA. L. REv. 1439,
1454 & n.70 (1998).
86. See Nelson & Cranford, supra note 26, at 321.
87. For some of the limiting effects of risk management in the legal context see Alfieri,
supra note 8, at 1933-40.
88. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007).
90. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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Risk management too often seems to make such a promise. When it does
so its blandishments are misleading and dangerous. Risk management's
record is marked by serious questions in the medical world. Lawyers
should go slow before embracing it.
Notes & Observations
